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Coordinating Public Good Provision by Mediated
Communication
By Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and In-Uck Park∗
We examine a setup where two agents allocate a fixed budget be-
tween public goods in two areas. The agents may be biased to one
area which is their private information. Without communication
the funds are allocated inefficiently resulting in gaps and duplica-
tion in public good provision. Direct communication between the
agents is ineffective and cannot resolve the coordination failure
even when the potential biases are negligible. Coordination can
be improved by a mediator who filters the information communi-
cated by the agents. Our results can throw light on how to improve
coordination of humanitarian aid by appropriately designed infor-
mation management system. (JEL D82, D83, H41, H84, L31)
Banerjee (2007) starts his book Making Aid Work with an episode from the 2005
earthquake in Pakistan. When international organizations and NGOs rushed in to
help, a group of economists got concerned about how the aid would get to the right
people. As no one was keeping track of where the aid had been delivered, some
villages received many consignments while others had no aid. The economists
figured that coordination would be improved by a website to which everyone
could report the location and amount of aid sent. Based on this information the
humanitarian organizations could decide where the next consignments should go.
Disaster management system Risepak was swiftly developed to achieve this goal.1
However, the humanitarian organizations were largely not willing to share their
information and Risepak did not reach a critical mass. Such unwillingness to share
information is often reported in the humanitarian sector and has been attributed,
e.g., as the cause of the coordination failure of the humanitarian response after
the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2010; Altay
and Labonte 2014).
We approach this allocation problem from the point of sensitivities in informa-
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tion sharing. As much as the humanitarian organizations aim to alleviate suffer-
ing, there is diversity in primary motivations. We show that in a public goods
setup such diversity makes direct information sharing – such as via an open ac-
cess platform – ineffective. Filtered communication via a mediator – such as an
appropriately designed information management system – can, however, improve
coordination. While we motivate our study with humanitarian aid, similar infor-
mation sharing issues arise in various situations where potentially biased agents
allocate funds to public goods, e.g., in R&D joint ventures or public agencies.
We examine a setup where two agents allocate a fixed budget of one each be-
tween public goods in two areas, A and B. The areas have equal needs and
therefore an equal allocation would maximize social welfare. The agents may,
however, have biased preferences which is their private information. The agent is
aligned with social welfare (neutral type) or biased to area A or B. Without com-
munication the funds are allocated inefficiently resulting in gaps and duplication
in public good provision.
Our first result is that direct communication is ineffective and cannot improve
the allocation. Since the allocations to each area are public goods, the agent
biased to area A has an incentive to represent himself as the type biased to B
who would favor area B in his allocation. If the message was perceived as honest,
it would steer the other agent to allocate less funds to area B and more funds
to area A. It is exactly the agent biased to A who has the greatest incentive to
send such a message rendering communication uninformative. In humanitarian
context, this result can speak to unsuccessful experiences in direct information
sharing, including an open access platform.
This result holds even when the potential biases are negligible in contrast to
Crawford and Sobel (1982) where communication can be informative when the
sender’s bias is small enough. Our setup differs from Crawford and Sobel where
the receiver knows the direction of the bias and only the receiver takes an action.
In our model the direction of the potential bias is unknown and both agents take
an action in a public good context. These features exacerbate the conflicts of
interests and render direct communication ineffective.
Our second result is that communication via a mediator who does not have
authority over the agents can improve the allocation. The agents report their
type to the mediator as cheap talk (i.e., costless and unverifiable messages a la
Crawford and Sobel 1982). The mediator can commit to a scheme which deter-
mines what information is revealed to the agents. This assumption applies well to
an information management system as the mediator. We focus on schemes where
the mediator announces a posterior profile (on the agents’ types) and “instructs”
allocations that form an equilibrium given the announced posteriors. In light of
the insight above that revealing the direction of the bias is not incentive compat-
ible, we restrict our attention to schemes that treat the biased types identically
and characterize the optimal scheme. We find that it is optimal for the media-
tor to reveal the types fully only if both agents report neutral. In this case, the
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mediator randomly assigns an area for each agent to specialize in. It is incentive
compatible for the neutral type to follow the mediator’s instruction as it results
in an equal allocation maximizing each agent’s utility and the social welfare.
The mediator filters the rest of the information and only reveals one agent as
biased – but not the direction of their bias. The case where both agents are biased
is partially pooled equally with each of the two cases where only one is biased.
Thus, when the mediator reveals one agent as biased, the other agent may be
biased or not.
Since the direction of the bias is never revealed, a biased agent cannot gain
anything by representing himself as the opposite type, but he might gain from
reporting neutral. Randomization discourages the biased types from untruthfully
reporting neutral. An agent biased to area A, when instructed to specialize in
area B, may obtain his preferred allocation by diverting some of his budget to
A given the other agent will specialize in A. However, he cannot bias the total
allocation in his favor when instructed to specialize in area A since the other agent
allocates all his budget to B. In addition, partial pooling in other cases generates
unequal expected biases for the two agents. This steers their allocations to diverge
and restrain certain biases, resulting in a more balanced total allocation.2 We
show that such information management induces the agents to reveal their types
truthfully and follow the instructions, provided that the biases to area A and B
are not of too different magnitude.
An extensive literature has developed on cheap talk communication since the
seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982). However, studies on mediated com-
munication have been sparse and largely conducted in very general framework
(Forges 1986, 1990) or between an informed party and a decision maker (Golts-
man, et al. 2009; Ivanov 2010) until recently. The current paper contributes to
this growing literature by exploring how mediated communication may benefit
multiple, privately informed players who are also action takers in a public good
environment.
Two recent papers also study similar issues in different contexts. Goltsman and
Pavlov (2014) show that Cournot duopoly firms with private costs may coordi-
nate through a simple mediated mechanism when direct communication does not
help. Hörner, Morelli and Squintani (2015) show that mediation can be devised
to resolve conflicts between sovereign entities (whose strengths are private infor-
mation) as effectively as if the mediator had enforcement power. As the players
wish to appear as a tough type to their opponents in these contexts, mediation
facilitates communication by constraining the aggression of stronger contenders
via information filtering. In our context, there is no dominant type the agents
wish to dress up as; instead, the problem stems from the agents trying to steer
others’ contributions in their own favor by misrepresenting their biases. Conse-
quently, filtering information in the current context is devised to mitigate such
2To be precise, the allocation is more balanced for all but one type realization and the expected social
welfare is higher.
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effects so as to foster communication.
Direct communication between agents making voluntary contributions to a pub-
lic good has been examined by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) and Palfrey, Rosen-
thal and Roy (2017). Their setup differs from ours in that there is only one public
good and therefore a freeriding incentive arises. However, the public good is dis-
crete and a threshold of contributions is needed giving the agents an incentive
to coordinate. They show that in this setup direct communication can enhance
efficiency.
Our work is also related to the literature on organizational design and com-
munication such as Dessein (2002), Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and
Rantakari (2008). Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008)
compare decentralization and horizontal communication to centralization and ver-
tical communication in a multidivisional organization. They show that when coor-
dination is very important decentralization can be optimal as divisional managers
have good incentives to coordinate via horizontal communication. We show that
in a public goods context such horizontal communication is ineffective but ver-
tical communication can improve coordination even when the control rights are
decentralized. Dessein (2002) examines delegation as an alternative to commu-
nication and finds that the principal prefers delegation to communication when
the agent’s bias is small relative to the principal’s uncertainty. The principal
furthermore delegates to an intermediary when the agent’s bias is moderate. In
our setup there is no principal and the intermediary does not have control rights
but has a role in mediating communication.
The paper is structured as follows. Section I sets up the allocation game.
Section II examines the allocation game when the agents do not communicate.
Section III shows that direct communication between the agents cannot improve
upon the outcome of no communication. Section IV analyzes the mediated com-
munication outcome and derives the conditions under which it results in welfare
improving allocation. Section V discusses applications. Section VI concludes and
Appendix contains deferred proofs.
I. Model
There are two agents, 1 and 2, with a budget of 1 to allocate in public goods
in two areas, A and B. Agent i ∈ {1, 2} allocates ai ∈ [0, 1] to area A leaving
(1− ai) to area B.3 The areas have equal needs and the social welfare index is
w(a) = −(1− a)2
where a = a1 + a2. Social welfare is maximized by allocating half of the total
budget of 2 to area A.
3For expositional ease, we assume that the agents must allocate all their budgets. This is the case in
equilibrium if both agents’ utility functions increase in allocations to each area.
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The agents are one of three types in T := {`, n, h} and have a utility function
−(1 + t − a)2 when of type t ∈ T where ` < n = 0 < h. That is, an `-type
(h-type) is biased against (toward) area A and wants less (more) funds in area A
than an n-type who is neutral. Agent’s type is their private information. Note
that, abusing notation slightly, `, n and h are used both for the types and the
degree of biases.
The three types are assumed to be equally likely in the main model,4 depicted






0) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). To simplify exposition, we also
assume that the potential biases are not too large and have different magnitudes.
ASSUMPTION 1: 0 < |`| < h < 1/8.
Although there is diversity in motivations of the public good providers, we
assume that they are not too biased. This is a reasonable assumption for many
public good providers, e.g., humanitarian organizations. Different magnitude of
bias can result, e.g., from the strength of prior relationship between the agent
and the recipient.5
We compare the agents’ allocation decisions with no communication, direct
communication between the agents, and mediated communication. Our interest
is finding out when and how communication can improve social welfare.
II. No Communication
The game with no communication is a standard static Bayesian game where the







denote agent i’s allocation strategy where ati is the amount that agent i allocates







1 + t− ati − as−i
)
where as−i is the other agent’s allocation. Then his unconstrained optimum from
the first order condition is







−i is the expected allocation of the other agent.
That is, since the two agents’ allocations are perfect substitutes, each type’s op-
timal allocation makes up for the shortfall of the other agent’s expected allocation
from his ideal allocation, 1 + t. Note that an n-type agent always allocates such
4In Appendix, the main results are proved more broadly than the uniform prior.
5Bilateral relationship, e.g., colonial history, trade relationship, common language and geographic
proximity, has been shown to increase humanitarian aid (Drury, Olson and Van Belle 2005; Strömberg
2007; Fink and Redaelli 2011).
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unconstrained optimal level, (1), because t = 0 and 0 ≤ E(a−i) ≤ 1. Other types
t ∈ {`, h} also allocate their unconstrained optimal levels subject to feasibility,
i.e., `-type allocates less than n-type by |`| and h-type more than n-type by h.
In case such allocation is infeasible because it is below 0 for `-type or above 1 for
h-type, the constrained optimum would be to allocate 0 or 1, respectively.
We show that every equilibrium is an interior equilibrium absent communica-
tion, that is, every type of both agents allocates their unconstrained optimal level,
(1). This result is recurring in subsequent analysis and prevails more broadly:





i for agent i ∈ {1, 2}
where µti is the probability that agent i is of type t ∈ T . (In the current case,




0 .) Therefore, we establish the result for the case that
Eb1 = Eb2.
First, consider an arbitrary interior equilibrium (presuming one exists) with















by (1) and, consequently, E(ai) = a
n
i + Ebi. Thus, agent i’s expected allocation
exceeds the allocation of the neutral type by Ebi.
The neutral type of either agent, say 1, covers the shortfall of the other agent
2’s expected allocation, i.e., an1 +E(a2) = 1. Since E(a2) exceeds a
n
2 by Eb2, this
implies that an1 +a
n
2 +Eb2 = 1. An analogous condition holds also for agent 2, i.e.,
an2 + a
n
1 + Eb1 = 1, in any interior equilibrium. Hence, Eb1 = Eb2 is necessary
for an interior equilibrium to exist. In other words, in an interior equilibrium
both agents of neutral type cover the shortfall of each other’s allocation plus the
associated expected bias, which is feasible if and only if the expected biases are
the same.
Indeed, if Eb1 = Eb2 = Eb, so long as
an1 + a
n
2 = 1− Eb and(2)
a`i = a
n
i + ` ≥ 0 and ahi = ani + h ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ |`| ≤ an1 , an2 ≤ 1− h,(3)







In a symmetric equilibrium, an1 = a
n
2 = (1 − Eb)/2. Additionally, there is a
continuum of asymmetric equilibria which can be obtained by increasing agent
i’s allocation and decreasing agent −i’s allocation by the same amount subject
to (2) and (3). In all these equilibria, the total allocation is the same contingent




1 + t+ a
n
2 + s = 1−Eb + t+ s for each type pair
(t, s).
Table 1 presents the total allocation (to area A) without communication where
Eb = (h+ `) /3. Both agents compensate for the other agent’s expected bias
in their allocations, resulting in two n-type agents underallocating to area A by
Eb. The biased types furthermore add their own bias to the allocation. Thus,
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the allocation is inefficient, i.e., it diverges from the socially optimal allocation
of 1 in every realization. Since the bias of h-type is larger than that of `-type,
there is overallocation to area A when at least one agent is of h-type. However,
equilibrium payoffs are identical across types and agents, calculated to be −2(h2−
h`+ `2)/9, because every type t obtains the unconstrained optimum of equalizing
the expected allocation to their ideal, 1 + t.
Table 1—Total allocation to A with no communication.
1\2 ` n h
` 1− h/3 + 5`/3 1− h/3 + 2`/3 1 + 2(h+ `)/3
n 1− h/3 + 2`/3 1− (h+ `)/3 1 + 2h/3− `/3
h 1 + 2(h+ `)/3 1 + 2h/3− `/3 1 + 5h/3− `/3
We have verified above that an interior equilibrium exists if and only if Eb1 =
Eb2 and the set of all interior equilibria is fully characterized by (2) and (3).
6
Next, we show that there is no other equilibrium when Eb1 = Eb2. With a
view to reaching a contradiction, suppose (a1, a2) is an equilibrium where some




2 without loss of generality,
7 either
a`1 = 0 > a
n
1 + ` or a
h
2 = 1 < a
n
2 + h is a constrained optimum (possibly both)
and all other values of ati are at their unconstrained optimum, (1). Recall that
E(ai) = a
n
i + Ebi if a
t
i is unconstrained optimum for all t ∈ T . Hence, a`1 = 0 >
an1 + ` would imply that E(a1) > a
n
1 + Eb1 and a
h
2 = 1 < a
n
2 + h would imply
that E(a2) < a
n
2 + Eb2. Since one of the two inequalities should hold, Eb1 = Eb2
implies E(a1) − an1 > E(a2) − an2 , or equivalently an2 + E(a1) > an1 + E(a2).
This contradicts the equilibrium condition for n-type: ani + E(a−i) = 1 for both
i = 1, 2, as by (1) ani is an unconstrained optimum. Intuitively, if a
`
1 = 0 or a
h
2 = 1
is the constrained optimum, it would imply that agent 1’s expected allocation is
biased upward more than agent 2’s expected allocation relative to their respective
allocation of n-type, incentivising the agents to adjust their allocations closer to
each other and moving away from the corner solution.
We summarize the results obtained in the absence of communication below.
PROPOSITION 1: In the absence of communication, the set of Bayesian Nash
equilibria (a1, a2) is fully characterized by (2) and (3) where Eb = (h+ `) /3. In
all these equilibria, the total allocation to area A for each type realization is given
in Table 1. The allocation is inefficient and the equilibrium payoff of each type is
−2(h2 − h`+ `2)/9.
6Note that we have only considered pure allocation strategies. As it is straightforward from the utility
function that the unconstrained optimum ati satisfies (1) even if the other agent adopts mixed strategies,
it follows that no mixed strategy equilibrium exists.




i + ` < E(a1) = E(a2) < a
n
i +h and thus, (1) would imply 2a
n
1 + ` < 1 < 2a
n
1 +h
and consequently, −` < ani < 1− h, contradicting some ati being a constrained optimum.
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III. Direct Communication
In this section, prior to allocation decisions we allow one round of communica-
tion in which agents i ∈ {1, 2} send a public cheap talk message mi simultane-






i ) on agent
i’s type by Bayes rule from agent i’s message sending strategy. The two agents
then make allocation decisions given the posterior profile (µ1, µ2), which we call
a continuation game. The entire game is referred to as the direct communication
game.
A. Allocations After Communication
We first examine the allocation decisions in the continuation game after com-
munication with a posterior profile (µ1, µ2).
8 These results will be instrumental
also in the analysis of mediated communication. Denoting the (continuation)












2), agent 1 of type
t ∈ {`, n, h} solves
(4) max
at1
− µ`2(1− at1 − a`2 + t)2 − µn2 (1− at1 − an2 + t)2 − µh2(1− at1 − ah2 + t)2.




µs2 (1 + t− at1 − as2 )

≤ 0 if at1 = 0
= 0 if at1 ∈ (0, 1)
≥ 0 if at1 = 1.













constitute an equilibrium if and only if they solve
(6)

a`1 = max{0, 1 + `− E(a2)}
an1 = 1− E(a2)
ah1 = min{1 + h− E(a2), 1}
and

a`2 = max{0, 1 + `− E(a1)}
an2 = 1− E(a1)
ah2 = min{1 + h− E(a1), 1}
where E(ai) is agent i’s expected allocation given µi. Note that this is the case
even when µi does not have a full support, in which case a
t
i is said to be “relevant”
if µti > 0 and “irrelevant” otherwise. As before, a
`
i = 0 > 1 + ` − E(a−i) and
ahi = 1 < 1 + h− E(a−i) are constrained optimum allocation levels.
An equilibrium is interior if all relevant allocations ati are unconstrained op-
timum, and is noninterior otherwise. Below we characterize the set of interior
8The dependence of µi on messages is suppressed when no confusion arises.
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and noninterior equilibria in the continuation game after communication, which
depends on whether the two agents’ expected biases coincide or not.
Interior equilibria
Consider interior equilibria where each relevant ati satisfies the first order condi-
tion (5) with equality. By taking expectation of a1 and a2 in (6) and rearranging,
we get









=⇒ hµh1 + `µ`1 = hµh2 + `µ`2.(7)
Thus, according to (7) a necessary condition for an interior equilibrium is that





i = 1, 2.
The analysis and results of Section II extend straightforwardly to this case
where Ebi = Eb(µi). We only need to modify Proposition 1 for possible irrelevant
allocation values, as stated in the lemma below.
LEMMA 1: In the continuation game with a posterior profile (µ1, µ2) such that
Eb(µ1) = Eb(µ2) = Eb, the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria (a1, a2) is fully
characterized by
(i) an1 + a
n
2 = 1− Eb, and
(ii) ati = a
n
i + t if µ
t
i > 0 for i ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ {`, h}.
In all these equilibria, the total allocation to area A for each type realization is
given in Table 2 (so long as µt11 · µ
t2





−i(Eb− t)2 regardless of type (so long as in the support of µi).
Table 2—Total allocation to A with direct communication.
1\2 ` n h
` 1 + 2`− Eb 1 + `− Eb 1 + h+ `− Eb
n 1 + `− Eb 1− Eb 1 + h− Eb
h 1 + h+ `− Eb 1 + h− Eb 1 + 2h− Eb
Noninterior equilibria
Suppose now that expected biases are not equal, say without loss of generality,
(8) Eb(µ1) < Eb(µ2).
Then there is a unique noninterior equilibrium as explained below.
Recall that the two agents of n-type just cover the shortfall of the other agent’s
expected allocation, i.e., ani = 1−E(a−i); or equivalently, they cover the shortfall
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of each other’s allocation, then reduce by E(a−i)− an−i to correct for the amount
of the other’s expected allocation in excess of n-type’s allocation, i.e.,
ani = 1− an−i − (E(a−i)− an−i) ⇐⇒ an1 + an2 = 1− (E(ai)− ani ) for i = 1, 2.
Hence, any equilibrium (a1, a2) must satisfy E(a1) − an1 = E(a2) − an2 , that
is, the expected allocation differs from the allocation of the neutral type by the
same amount for both agents. If (8) holds, however, this is possible neither in an
interior equilibrium where E(ai)− ani = Eb(µi), nor in a noninterior equilibrium
where an1 ≥ an2 because then either ah1 = 1 or a`2 = 0 is noninterior so that
E(a1)− an1 ≤ Eb(µ1) and Eb(µ2) ≤ E(a2)− an2 .
Therefore, only noninterior equilibrium with an1 < a
n
2 is possible, where a
`
1
or/and ah2 is noninterior while all the other allocations are interior solutions to (4).
The equilibrium is unique because the optimal level of ani moves in the opposite
direction as an−i but at a rate no higher than unity, resulting in a unique fixed point
(see Appendix). For each agent i, the equilibrium payoff of type t is the same so
long as ati is interior solution (which is always the case for t = n) because such
types obtain unconstrained optimum, but is lower if ati is noninterior because such
a type only obtains constrained optimum. The findings are summarized below.
LEMMA 2: If Eb(µ1) < Eb(µ2), there is a unique equilibrium (a1, a2) and it is













and a`2 are interior solutions (even if irrelevant). For each agent i, the equilibrium
payoff is lower for a type with a noninterior allocation than for those types with
interior allocations who thus have identical payoffs.
B. Direct Communication Has No Effect
Having examined the allocation choices as above, consider now a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) of the direct communication game. Agent i sends a message
mik from a set Mi = {mi1,mi2, · · · ,miKi} of Ki messages, inducing a posterior
belief µik on his type to be held by the other agent. We label messages so that a
message labelled higher induces a posterior with a weakly higher expected bias:
Eb(µi1) ≤ Eb(µi2) ≤ · · · ≤ Eb(µiKi) for i = 1, 2.
If agent i’s expected bias does not depend on the message he sends, i.e.,
Eb(µi1) = Eb(µiKi) for i = 1, 2, it must be equal to the prior bias (h+ `) /3.
Then, regardless of the messages sent, the continuation equilibrium outcome is
the same as that without communication (Proposition 1). This corresponds to
the so-called babbling equilibrium where agents send arbitrary messages randomly
because they will be ignored completely.
The main result to establish is that there is no other equilibrium than a babbling
equilibrium in the direct communication game. In a nutshell, the core logic is as
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follows. If Eb(µ11) < Eb(µ1K1), agent 1 would appear more likely to be of h-type
by sending the maximal message m1K1 than the minimum message m11. This
would induce agent 2 to anticipate higher allocation by agent 1 to area A and
thus, shift his own allocation away from A to B. Since the allocations are public
goods, it is actually `-type (rather than h-type) who would benefit from such
shifting by agent 2. Thus, `-type has an incentive to appear as h-type by sending
messages that induce higher expected biases. Similarly, an h-type agent would
have a greater incentive to send messages with lower expected biases. Then,
the equilibrium posteriors of the messages would be self-defeating due to such
crossed incentives, rendering communication uninformative. Accordingly, direct
communication cannot help the agents to coordinate and the resulting allocation
is the same as under no communication.
This result holds even when the potential biases are negligible in contrast to
Crawford and Sobel (1982) where informative communication is feasible if the
sender’s bias is small enough. Our setup differs importantly from Crawford and
Sobel where the receiver is the only decision maker and knows the direction of
the sender’s bias. In our model the direction of the potential bias is unknown
and both agents take an action in a public goods context. It is the combination
of these factors that results in uninformative communication.
We now provide a more detailed description of why meaningful direct communi-
cation is impossible. This proves useful in stating the result precisely and thereby,
clarify the relationship between direct and mediated communication. Neverthe-
less, one may skip this technical part and go to Section IV to see how mediated
communication improves welfare.
Returning to the analysis of PBE of the direct communication game, let us
examine if a non-babbling equilibrium may be possible. To facilitate illustration,
we focus on the case that
Eb(µ11) ≤ Eb(µ21) and Eb(µ2K2) ≤ Eb(µ1K1),
that is, the range of agent 1’s expected biases after communication is weakly
wider than that of agent 2. Then, aiming to prove that the expected biases are
all equal, suppose they are not. That is, Eb(µ11) < (h+ `) /3 < Eb(µ1K1). This
implies that µh1K1 > 0, i.e., agent 1 of h-type uses the maximal message m1K1
(with a positive probability).
First, consider the case that µ`11 > 0, i.e., the minimum message m11 is used
by agent 1 of `-type, referred to as “agent 1-`” for brevity. After sending m11,
agent 1-` encounters a continuation game with a posterior pair (µ11, µ2k) for any
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K2}. If agent 2 sends a message that induces expected bias of
the same magnitude, Eb(µ11) = Eb(µ2k), the continuation equilibrium is interior
and agent 1-` obtains the same continuation payoff as agent 1-n by Lemma 2.
If Eb(µ11) < Eb(µ2k), agent 1-` obtains the same continuation payoff as agent
1-n if a`1 is unconstrained optimum but a lower payoff otherwise (Lemma 3).
12 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
Therefore, the expected payoff of agent 1-` from sending the message m11 is no
higher than that of agent 1-n and is strictly lower if a`1 is noninterior in at least
one continuation equilibrium. On the other hand, if agent 1-` sends the maximum
message m1K1 , since Eb(µ1K1) ≥ Eb(µ2k) we deduce that agent 1-` always obtains
the same payoff as that of agent 1-n because a`1 is interior in every continuation
game with Eb(µ1K1) ≥ Eb(µ2k) by Lemmas 2 and 3.9 Thus,
(a) The extra payoff from sending m1K1 instead of m11 is higher for agent
1-` than for agent 1-n, strictly so if a`1 is noninterior in at least in one
continuation equilibrium after sending m11.
Analogously, by Lemmas 2 and 3, agent 1-h always obtains the unconstrained
optimum after sending the message m11 because Eb(µ11) ≤ Eb(µ2k), but may fail
to do so after sending the message m1K1 because Eb(µ1K1) ≥ Eb(µ2k). Hence,
(b) The extra payoff from sending m11 instead of m1K1 is higher for agent
1-h than for agent 1-n, strictly so if ah1 is noninterior in at least in one
continuation equilibrium after sending m1K1 .
Finally, if agent 1-n weakly prefers m1K1 to m11 in the presumed equilibrium,
then agent 1-` should strictly prefer sending m1K1 to m11 by (a), provided that
a`1 is noninterior in at least in one continuation equilibrium after sending m11.
Alternatively, if agent 1-n weakly prefers m11 to m1K1 , agent 1-h should strictly
prefer sending m11 to m1K1 by (b), provided that a
h
1 is noninterior in at least in
one continuation equilibrium after sending m1K1 . The former would contradict
the supposition above that agent 1-` uses m11, and the latter would contradict
the assertion above that agent 1-h uses m1K1 . We show in Appendix that one of
these prevails.
Next, consider the case that agent 1-` does not use message m11, i.e. µ
`
11 = 0.
Then, µn11 > 0 and 0 ≤ Eb(µ11). In particular, agent 1-n optimally sends the
message m11 and thus weakly prefers it to m1K1 . It follows as before that agent




ah1 is noninterior in at least one continuation equilibrium after sending m1K1 but





and an1 > 1− h in the continuation equilibrium after the message pair (m11,m21)
so that ah1 is noninterior. In this case, we show in Appendix that agent 2-h would




The arguments sketched above establish that no equilibrium message induces a
posterior different from the prior. This is subject to one minor caveat implicitly
assumed in resolving the above mentioned tricky case:
(∗) The continuation equilibrium after any message pair is the same so long as
the induced posterior profile is the same.
9To be fully precise, a`1 may be noninterior when it is irrelevant (i.e., µ
`
1 = 0) and Eb(µ1K1 ) =
Eb(µ2k). Such cases are taken care of in the proof of Proposition 2.
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We believe that this is sensible assumption in direct communication game where
cheap talk messages have little role beyond the posteriors they induce. However,
we discuss what happens if this condition is relaxed in the next subsection.
PROPOSITION 2: In every PBE of the direct communication game that satisfies
(∗), the total allocation is identical to that in the equilibrium without communi-
cation.
C. Jointly Controlled Lotteries
The condition (∗) is innocuous for continuation games with posteriors of unequal
expected biases (because the continuation equilibrium is unique) and those with
posteriors of equal biases and full supports (because all continuation equilibria
generate identical payoffs for all types). When the expected biases are equal and
some biased types are irrelevant, however, the irrelevant type’s (off-equilibrium)
continuation payoff may differ depending on which continuation equilibrium pre-
vails. This opens the possibility of reviving some communication by employing
a “jointly controlled lottery” à la Forges (1990) to manipulate truthtelling incen-
tives.
It turns out that such manipulation may have an impact only in the continuation
game starting with the posterior pair µ1 = µ2 = (0, 1, 0) when the magnitudes
of biases, h and |`|, are close enough. We outline the efficient PBE in such cases
below.
In the efficient PBE, both agents send the same message b if of a biased type,
i.e., if t ∈ {h, `}. This removes the incentive of the biased agent to pretend to
be of the opposite type as they simply say ‘biased’. When of a neutral type,
they randomize between sending messages n and n′ with equal probability. The
continuation equilibrium is as follows depending on the message pair sent:
• After (b, b), any continuation equilibrium for Eb(µ1) = Eb(µ2) = (h+ `) /2
described in Lemma 1 follows.
• After only one agent reports b, the unique noninterior equilibrium follows
(Lemma 2).
• After (n, n) and (n′, n′), agent 1 allocates 1 to area A and 2 allocates 0.
• After (n, n′) and (n′, n), agent 1 allocates 0 to area A and 2 allocates 1.
Any message pair (m1,m2) ∈ {n, n′} × {n, n′} induces a posterior pair µ1 =
µ2 = (0, 1, 0) and each agent specializes in one area. The area of specialization
is randomized depending on the messages. The role of two equivalent messages,
n and n′, is to introduce jointly controlled randomization in order to discourage
the biased types from pretending to be unbiased.
The description above constitutes a PBE of the direct communication game if
sending messages as above is optimal given the stipulated continuation equilibria.







−0.81h, that is, when the biases to area A and B are of a relatively similar
magnitude.
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In this case, the total allocation is given in Table 3. Compared with a babbling
equilibrium (Table 1), separating the neutral type from the biased types increases
expected welfare. First, ideal allocation is obtained when both agents are neutral
as the agents specialize in different areas. Second, the expected bias is larger
when both agents report biased, (b, b), than in the babbling equilibrium, leading
to a larger under-allocation (to A) by both agents to correct the larger upward
bias of the other agent. This pushes the total allocation closer to (away from) the
social optimum when at least one agent is of h-type (both are `-type) relative to
the babbling equilibrium. The positive effect dominates because the inefficiency
is larger in the babbling equilibrium when both agents are of h-type than of `-
type and welfare function is quadratic. Lastly, if one agent is neutral and the
other agent is biased, the biased agent’s allocation is constrained at 1 when of
h-type. Together with the certainty that the opponent is neutral, this reduces the
variance of the biased agent’s allocation and consequently, improves efficiency.
Table 3—Total allocation to A with jointly controlled lottery.
1\2 ` n h
` 1− h/2 + 3`/2 1 + ` 1 + h/2 + `/2
n 1 + ` 1 1− `
h 1 + h/2 + `/2 1− ` 1 + 3h/2− `/2
This result relies on the jointly controlled lottery which reduces the incentive
for biased types to “lie”: by sending n or n′, either biased type t ∈ {h, `} faces a
1/2 chance of ending up with |t| away from their ideal allocation.10
Such randomization does not appear a particularly natural consequence of di-
rect communication; it rather seems a sensible outcome of guided communication
by a mediator. In fact, we show in Section IV that mediated communication
achieves even higher welfare by introducing partial pooling.
For a smooth flow, we defer detailed analysis of this Section to Online Ap-
pendix, where we also prove that the PBE specified above achieves the maximum






h/4, but the bab-
bling equilibrium is the unique PBE otherwise.
10Without randomization, at least one biased type of either agent can get their ideal allocation for sure
by pretending to be unbiased when the other agent is indeed unbiased, rendering separation between
biased and unbiased types non-viable under the condition (∗). Hence, a variety of different jointly
controlled lotteries work in our model, so long as they introduce enough uncertainty in continuation
equilibrium for the neutral type to discourage pretension by other types. In other contexts, e.g., Krishna
and Morgan (2004), they are used to introduce just the right amount of uncertainty for a threshold type
to be indifferent between multiple messages, so that there is a unique jointly controlled lottery that works
for a given equilibrium outcome.
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IV. Mediated Communication
In this Section we analyze mediated communication between the agents. In the
first stage, the agents privately report/send a cheap talk message to the mediator
(M). In the second stage, M makes a public announcement interpreted as an
“instruction” (which is also cheap talk). M does not have authority over the
agents, so they are not obliged to follow her instructions. In the third stage, each
agent simultaneously selects an allocation contingent on his type, his report and
the instruction received.
Before the first stage, M publicly and credibly commits to an announcement
strategy as a function of the agents’ reports, which we refer to as a mediation
scheme. Given a mediation scheme, we examine the PBE of the game between the
two agents as above. Our aim is to study whether and to what extent mediation
may improve social welfare relative to the case of direct or no communication
examined above.
A. Mediation Schemes
Note that the Revelation Principle applies à la Myerson (1982) and thus, we
only need to consider mediation schemes that induce a PBE in which the agents
report their types truthfully and follow the instructions. Ideally, we would like to
characterize optimal mediation schemes that induce a PBE with the maximum
social welfare achievable with any mediation scheme. But, finding an optimal
mediation scheme is generally known to be difficult, and the current case is no
exception. Instead, we characterize below the optimal mediation scheme subject
to two conditions that we think are reasonable:
(c1) M’s instruction is consistent with a continuation equilibrium (interior or
noninterior) characterized in Section III.A.
(c2) M may reveal whether an agent is biased or not, but not the direction of
bias.
Any announcement that fails (c1) entails that an agent’s posterior on the other’s
types differ depending on his own type, creating nontrivial complications in fig-
uring out the continuation equilibrium for each such announcement. (c2) reflects
our finding that the direction of bias cannot be effectively communicated directly,
the underlying strategic reasoning for which also exists inherently in mediated
communication.11 The two conditions obviously restrict the set of mediation
schemes we consider. However, we suspect that other schemes are likely to be too
complex for practical use.
Hence, we focus our attention to mediation schemes where M announces pub-
licly a posterior profile µ = (µ1, µ2) ∈ P := ∆(T ) × ∆(T ) and instructs an
11For the simple case that both agents are one of two types, h or `, it can be shown straightforwardly
that even mediated communication is ineffective for this reason.
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allocation profile a = (a1, a2) ∈ A := [0, 1]6. By virtue of the Revelation Princi-
ple, therefore, we define a “mediation scheme” as π : T × T → ∆(P × A) that
specifies, contingently on the report profile (t1, t2) ∈ T × T received privately
from the two agents, the probability with which the mediator publicly announces
a posterior profile µ and an allocation profile a that, by condition (c1), forms a
continuation equilibrium for the posterior profile µ. Condition (c2) requires that
the two biased types are equally likely for each agent according to µ, i.e.,
(9) π(µ,a|t1, t2) > 0 for some (t1, t2) ∈ T × T =⇒ µ`i = µhi for i = 1, 2.
We take it as given that this condition holds for all mediation schemes in what
follows.
Given a mediation scheme π, consider an arbitrary announcement (µ,a) made
with a positive probability. Conditional on truthful reporting by the agents, each







∀ t−i ∈ T.
We say that a scheme π is consistent if, for every message (µ,a) in the support
of π, the posterior on the other agent −i above is well-defined for every “relevant”
type ti (i.e, µ
ti
i > 0) and coincides with the announced posterior µ−i. Given a
consistent scheme π, conditional on truthful reporting, following the instructed
allocation is optimal for both players as it constitutes a continuation equilibrium
by construction. A consistent scheme is incentive-compatible (IC) if truthful-
reporting is optimal for both agents conditional on the other agent reporting
truthfully. For brevity, we say a scheme π is CIC if it is consistent and incentive-
compatible. Given a CIC scheme, it is clearly a PBE for both agents to report
truthfully and follow the announced allocation. In what follows, we solve for the
optimal CIC mediation scheme.
DEFINITION: A mediation scheme is optimal if it maximizes the expected social
welfare among all CIC mediation schemes.
B. Optimal Mediation Scheme
We show that in any optimal mediation scheme the agents’ types are revealed
fully only when both agents are neutral. Each agent is then instructed to specialize
in a randomly chosen area achieving equal allocation and maximizing welfare,
while minimizing the incentive for biased types to appear as neutral. In all other
cases, only one agent is revealed as biased, inducing partial pooling on the other
agent who may be biased or not. Such filtering of types leads to unequal expected
12Note that this posterior is well-defined for ti if and only if π(µ,a|ti, t−i) > 0 for some t−i, hence
may be well-defined for some but not other type(s) of agent i.
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biases and noninterior equilibrium reducing the variance of allocations. While
direct communication with jointly controlled lotteries can achieve randomized
specialization of two neutral agents—albeit quite unnaturally—partial pooling
requires a mediator. This is the key reason why mediation can improve welfare.
We now proceed to prove these insights by informally deriving a series of Lem-
mas. From now on, for brevity we refer to π simply as a “scheme” and denote an
announcement (µ,a) of M simply by the posterior pair µ, with the understanding
that a corresponding a (which is a continuation equilibrium for µ) is implicit.
Consider a CIC scheme π′ and its “dual scheme” πd obtained from π′ by swap-
ping agents 1 and 2, that is, πd(µ2, µ1|t, s) = π′(µ1, µ2|s, t) for all (µ1, µ2) ∈
∆(T ) × ∆(T ) and (s, t) ∈ T × T . Let π be a modified scheme that announces
the same as either π′ or πd with equal probability after every report profile (s, t),
so that π is a symmetric scheme in the sense that the two agents are treated
symmetrically, that is,
(10) π(µ1, µ2|s, t) = π(µ2, µ1|t, s) for all (s, t) ∈ T × T.
Since π′ is consistent by construction, so is π; since both π′ and πd are IC, so is
π. Moreover, π′ and πd generate the same welfare as they are identical modulo
relabelling of agents and consequently, so does π. Therefore, we may focus on
symmetric schemes to characterize an optimal scheme.
LEMMA 3: There is an optimal mediation scheme that is symmetric.
Consider a consistent and symmetric mediation scheme π and a posterior pair













i denote the probability that agent i is of a biased type
according to µi, hence the probability that he is unbiased is µ
n
i = 1 − βi. Then,
µi is a convex combination of the biased posterior denoted by µb := (1/2, 0, 1/2)















+ (1− βi) · (0, 1, 0) = βiµb + (1− βi)µn.
We call µi a composite posterior if 0<βi<1 (i.e, a proper combination of µb and
µn) and more biased if βi is higher. Clearly, the more biased is a posterior the
higher is its expected bias.
By symmetry, if µ = (µ1, µ2) is announced by π then its “dual” (µ2, µ1) is also
announced with the same probability. If either posterior in µ, say µ2, is composite,
then we can modify the scheme π to another scheme π′ by decomposing µ2 into
µb and µn when paired with µ1, via revealing whether agent 2 is biased or not:
that is, for any (t1, t2) such that π(µ1, µ2|t1, t2) > 0,
• set π′(µ1, µn|t1, t2) = π(µ1, µ2|t1, t2) if t2 = n;
• set π′(µ1, µb|t1, t2) = π(µ1, µ2|t1, t2) if t2 ∈ {h, `},
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and analogously for the dual posterior (µ2, µ1). Recall that it is implicit that
(µ1, µn) and (µ1, µb) are announced with a corresponding continuation equilibrium
allocation. We say that µ2 is “decomposed (into µb and µn)” when π is modified
to π′ as above.
The modified scheme is clearly consistent, but not necessarily IC because re-
porting incentives may have changed. In Lemma 4 below, we examine the welfare
effects of a few key modifications conditional on truthful reporting. As a result,
we will identify a relatively simple consistent scheme with maximum welfare con-
ditional on truthful reporting. Then, we show that it is indeed an optimal scheme
(i.e., satisfies IC) unless h and |`| are too far apart.
LEMMA 4: Consider a posterior pair (µ1, µ2) announced by a consistent scheme π,
where µ1 is composite and weakly less biased than µ2. Conditional on truthful re-
porting, the expected welfare
(a) strictly increases when µ2 is decomposed;
(b) strictly decreases when µ2 = µb and µ1 is decomposed; and
(c) strictly increases when µ2 = µb and the posterior pair (µ1, µ2) = (µ1, µb) is
merged with another posterior pair (µ̃1, µb) announced by π.
The first modification in Lemma 4 starts with a composite posterior pair (µ1, µ2).
Suppose for the sake of illustration that this is a “trivial” scheme where M simply
announces the prior, µ1 = µ2 = µ0, and the allocations of a babbling equilib-
rium. Such scheme is obviously CIC. Then modify the scheme so that it reveals
whether agent 2 is neutral or biased. According to Lemma 4(a), this modifi-
cation leads to higher expected welfare. The welfare improvement stems from
constrained allocation of biased types in noninterior equilibria. Specifically, when
µ2 is decomposed and (µ1, µn) is announced instead of (µ1, µ2), the continuation
equilibrium is noninterior where agent 2 of n-type, “agent 2-n” for short, obtains
a higher payoff (which coincides with social welfare) because he optimizes against
agent 1’s allocation which now has a lower variance (since agent 1-h’s allocation
is constrained). When (µ1, µb) is announced instead of (µ1, µ2), agent 2-h’s allo-
cation is constrained so that the total allocation is closer to social optimum on
average. Hence, the expected social welfare is improved.13
Next, consider the case that agent 2 is revealed to be biased. According to
Lemma 4(b), modifying the scheme to reveal further whether agent 1 is biased
or not would lower welfare. When (µb, µb) is announced instead of (µ1, µb), the
continuation equilibrium is interior which hurts welfare due to an enlarged dis-
parity in allocation between biased types of agent 2. When (µn, µb) is announced,
welfare improves because ah2 gets more constrained due to lower Eb(µ1). But, the
former effect dominates because the (quadratic) welfare index drops more quickly
as the total allocation moves away from the optimum than the index rises as it
moves toward the optimum.
13We show in Appendix that the same result obtains by decomposing the more biased posterior if
µ1 6= µ2 (because a posterior pair with µb is announced with a higher probability where the welfare
improvement is more pronounced).
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATING PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION 19
Hence, decomposing µ1 does not help in a posterior pair with µ2 = µb. If there
is another posterior pair announced by a consistent scheme with µ2 = µb, merging
the two posterior pairs (in the obvious manner described in Appendix) increases
expected welfare according to Lemma 4(c), because consolidating agent 1’s poste-
riors reduces uncertainty. Thus, only one posterior pair may be announced with
µ2 = µb.
Lastly, we consider the case where one of the agents was revealed to be neutral,
which arises when the more biased posterior is decomposed à la Lemma 4(a).
Lemma 5 below shows that revealing also whether the other agent is biased does
not change welfare but relaxes ICs if combined with randomized specialization
when both are unbiased. For consistency, we continue to treat agent 1 as the less
biased agent.
LEMMA 5: Suppose a posterior pair (µn, µ2) is announced by a consistent scheme
where µ2 is composite. Decomposing µ2 does not affect welfare conditional on
truthful reporting, but reduces the incentive to misreport for biased types t ∈ {h, `}




2 ) = (1, 0) and (0, 1) with equal
probability.
Consider a posterior pair (µn, µ2) announced where µ2 is composite. In the
continuation equilibrium, since agent 1’s allocation is certain at an1 , agents 2-
n and 2-` optimally cover the shortfall from their ideal, i.e., an2 = 1 − an1 and
a`2 = 1 + ` − an1 from (6). Then, for an1 = 1 − E(a2) to hold we must have
ah2 − an2 = |`|. Since ah2 = 1 is constrained, it follows that an2 = 1 + `, a`2 = 1 + 2`
and an1 = −`. Note that this holds even if µ2 = µb; and that an1 + an2 = 1 which
will also be the case when the posterior pair (µn, µn) is announced. Therefore,
the total allocation does not change when µ2 is decomposed, hence neither does
social welfare. However, decomposing µ2 can reduce the incentive of biased types
to report neutral by introducing random specialization when both report neutral:
as explained earlier, when both agents report neutral, a misreporting type would
half of the time face the worst case that the other agent allocates nothing in his
preferred area.
In the light of Lemmas 4 and 5, from any symmetric scheme one can keep
modifying to increase the expected welfare or reduce misreporting incentives until
no further such modification is possible. At the end of this process, the more
biased posterior in any pair cannot be composite (Lemma 4(a) and Lemma 5)
and only one pair (and its dual) survives with µb as the more biased posterior by
Lemma 4(c). Hence, the final scheme, denoted by π∗, announces three posterior




1 = π∗(µn, µn|n, n) = π∗(µb, µ0.5|b, n) = π∗(µ0.5, µb|n, b)
1/2 = π∗(µb, µ0.5|b, b) = π∗(µ0.5, µb|b, b).
20 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
Here, we use b to denote agents’ reports ti ∈ {h, `} as an argument of π∗.
Thus, π∗ reveals both agents to be neutral when they are (with random alloca-
tion instructions); but does not reveal when both are biased by partially pooling
with the case where only one agent is biased. Partial pooling avoids the welfare
loss stemming from high variances of interior equilibria when both agents are
revealed to be biased. Such partial pooling requires coordination by a mediator,
hence is infeasible under direct communication even with jointly controlled lot-
tery. The total allocation, presented in Table 4, is therefore more efficient than
under direct communication.
Table 4—Total allocation to A with mediation scheme π∗.
1\2 ` n h
` 1− h/4 + 7`/4 1− h/4 + 3`/4 1 + (h+ `)/4 or 1 + 3(h+ `)/4
n 1− h/4 + 3`/4 1 1 + h/4− 3`/4
h 1 + 3(h+ `)/4 or 1 + (h+ `)/4 1 + h/4− 3`/4 1 + 5h/4− 3`/4
The scheme π∗ is clearly consistent, and maximizes welfare subject to truthful
reporting because it is obtained by modifying any consistent scheme without
reducing welfare. Hence, π∗ would be the optimal scheme if it is IC. The IC
conditions are strongest when the posterior (µn, µn) is announced with allocation
pairs (a1, a2) = (a, ā) and (a1, a2) = (ā, a) with equal probabilities where a =
(a`, an, ah) = (0, 0, h) and ā = (ā`, ān, āh) = (1 + `, 1, 1), which we postulate for
π∗.14 Then, so long as h and |`| are not too far apart, π∗ is IC and thus is optimal
as stated in the following Proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: The scheme π∗ generates the maximum welfare among all
consistent schemes conditional on truthful reporting. It is the optimal scheme if
and only if ` ≤ (1− 2
√
14)h/11 ≈ −0.59h.
If agent 1 reports biased, he induces (µb, µ0.5) with probability 2/3 or (µ0.5, µb)
with probability 1/3, while if he reports neutral, he induces (µn, µn) with prob-
ability 1/3 or (µ0.5, µb) with probability 2/3. Hence, the biased type’s incentive
to misreport increases with the extra payoff he obtains in the continuation equi-
librium after (µn, µn) or (µ0.5, µb) as compared to after (µb, µ0.5). This is higher
for `-type than h-type because the randomization after (µn, µn) is less damaging
for `-type; and is overwhelming for `-type when h − |`| is large enough because
then the damage is sufficiently small. Since n-type has no incentive to misreport
as biased, it follows that π∗ is IC if |`| is not too small relative to h as stated in
14The probabilities do not matter with which allocation pairs (a, ā) and (ā, a) are announced along
with the posterior (µn, µn). This is because, whatever the probabilities, each agent expect (a, ā) and
(ā, a) with equal probability due to symmetric treatment of the two agents. However, it is critical
that the instructed allocations are complete specialization of each agent in one area, because any less
specialization would increase the incentive for biased agents to report neutral.
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Proposition 3. The IC holds for a substantially larger range of |`| than under di-
rect communication with jointly controlled lottery. This is because the mediated
partial pooling enhances the payoff of biased types from truthful reporting.
V. Applications
A. Coordination of Humanitarian Aid
Our results can throw light on coordination of humanitarian aid. In an emer-
gency humanitarian organizations (HOs) allocate aid to affected areas. Coordi-
nation failure is a recurring theme in evaluations of aid delivery. There can be
duplication of aid in some areas and gaps in others. Some evaluations attribute
coordination failure to HOs’ reluctance to share information. Our results sug-
gest that such environments have an inherent incentive problem which results in
ineffectiveness of direct communication even when the HOs are fairly aligned.
Our result can also speak to the experience of disaster management system
Risepak. Risepak was developed to improve coordination in the 2005 earthquake
in Pakistan. The idea was that each HO could display at a village level the amount
and type of aid delivered to improve coordination of subsequent deliveries. Despite
its potential, most HOs were not willing to share their information and Risepak
failed to achieve critical mass. “Although a great deal of thought was dedicated
to the potential applications of Risepak once the system reached a critical mass
of data, less attention seems to have been paid to creating immediate incentives
for organizations to provide the information in the first place.” (Amin 2008, p.
260). Such open access website is in effect equivalent to direct communication.
Our result on ineffectiveness of direct communication provides an explanation for
Risepak’s experience and, by identifying the inherent incentive problem, provides
a starting point for the solution.
Our result on mediated communication suggests that coordination can be im-
proved by appropriately designed information management system. In this re-
spect our model is too simple for practical purposes. However, we conjecture that
the ability to raise welfare by employing a mechanism that filters information
is robust and the reasonable restrictions we imposed on the mechanism will be
helpful for further research.
There are some information management tools currently used within the Clus-
ter Approach. Cluster Approach was introduced by the Humanitarian Reform of
2005 to improve coordination of humanitarian aid.15 Cluster Approach divides
the response to various clusters, e.g., shelter, nutrition and health, and assigns
a leader organization to coordinate each cluster. The cluster leads do not have
authority over the partners but they can induce coordination, e.g., by informa-
tion sharing. Information management tools available include ‘Who does What
15https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach
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Where’ (3W) and Humanitarian Dashboard. 3W reports the number of orga-
nizations operating in each cluster and in each district. However, the districts
are large16 and there is no information about the budgets. Humanitarian Dash-
board reports the percentage of aid requirements met in each cluster in a given
emergency but typically has no geographical information.17
The current information management tools clearly filter the information, al-
though not necessarily optimally. Let us focus on regional allocation and 3W.18
According to our results, an HO has an incentive to downplay its operations in its
priority region and exaggerate them in its low-priority region.19 However, since
only the operational presence – but not its scale – is reported in 3W, untruthful
report would be easily detected and could result in loss of reputation. The crude
reporting of 3W is therefore robust to the type of gaming we have analyzed. 3W
improves coordination by very rough identification of gaps and overlaps and is
particularly helpful when the HOs enter the emergency sequentially or expand
their operations to new regions.
Our result on mediated communication raises the question whether coordination
of more fine-tuned budget allocations after entry could be improved. Budget
allocations and priorities are soft information and it would be possible for the HOs
to exaggerate or downplay them. Therefore HOs’ reports need to be appropriately
filtered to give incentives for informative communication. Further research is
required to find practical insights for a more complex setup than we have analyzed
in this paper.
B. Other Applications
Our analysis has wider applicability than coordination of humanitarian aid.
There are various situations where potentially biased agents allocate funds be-
tween public goods. In a research joint venture, the partners allocate funds be-
tween different projects and may have biased preferences depending, e.g., on the
importance of the potential innovation for the parent company. Public agencies
(research grant councils, for example) allocate funds between different regions
and projects and may have objectives that are not fully aligned. Development
aid agencies allocate aid between social sectors (health and education) and other
16The districts in 3W are counties while Risepak was working at a village level.
17Cluster Approach also offers additional benefits to the humanitarian organizations, such as security
and consolidated appeals for funding, which are important to ensure participation.
18Regional allocation (rather than allocation between different clusters as in Humanitarian Dashboard)
is the relevant dimension for humanitarian organizations which typically specialize in one cluster.
19Nonneutrality of humanitarian aid is well established at the country level. In addition to needs,
news coverage and bilateral relationship (e.g. colonial history, trade relationship, common language
and geographic proximity) increase humanitarian aid (Drury, Olson and Van Belle 2005; Eisensee and
Strömberg 2007; Strömberg 2007; Fink and Redaelli 2011). At regional level, spatial inertia favors regions
where the humanitarian organizations have prior operations (Jayne et al. 2002). Some governments target
relief aid to regions with stronger political support (Jayne et al. 2001; Plümper and Neumayer 2009;
Francken, Minten and Swinnen 2012) or to more informed electorates (Besley and Burgess 2001, 2002).
Furthermore, it is generally believed that NGOs locate to media hotspots as visibility and demonstrable
activity are important for securing funding (Cooley and Ron 2002).
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public expenditure programs (e.g. transportation) as well as regionally and may
have different priorities.20 Our main result is that even when the agents are fairly
aligned, but the direction of their potential bias is unknown, coordination by
direct communication fails and results in inefficient allocation of funds.
Coordination can, however, be improved by an appropriately designed infor-
mation management system. The agents report their planned allocations (or
alternatively, their priorities) and the system filters information so that no infor-
mation is revealed about the direction of any reported priorities.21 Appropriately
designed information management system gives the agents the incentives to report
truthfully and improves the allocation of funds.
VI. Conclusion
We studied two potentially biased agents providing public goods in two areas, A
and B, with equal needs. When the agents do not communicate, the allocation of
funding is inefficient. Our main result is that direct communication is ineffective
even when the agents are fairly aligned if the direction of their potential bias is not
known. An agent biased to A would represent himself as biased to B with the aim
of influencing the other agent to allocate more funds to area A. We furthermore
show that a mediator (or an information management system) who filters the
information communicated by the agents can improve coordination even when
the mediator does not have any control rights. We have analyzed allocation in
a stylized setup but we conjecture that our key insights are not sensitive to the
details of our model.
Our main application is in humanitarian aid. Our result on ineffective di-
rect communication provides a novel explanation to unsuccessful coordination
attempts, e.g., via an open access website. Our results on mediated communica-
tion points to the direction of a well-designed information management system to
coordinate humanitarian aid. Our model is also applicable to various other sit-
uations where several agents with potentially diverse motivations allocate funds
(or time and attention) to public goods, for example, in R&D joint ventures and
public agencies.
An interesting direction for future research is to explore management as coor-
dination. For instance, a manager may act as a coordinator across two divisions
allocating funds between public goods for the company. The manager then has a
role even when the decision rights are decentralized and the relevant information
is dispersed in the company. Our model could be developed further to be more
suitable for such management settings.
20See Halonen-Akatwijuka (2007) on coordination failure in development aid caused by asymmetric
information about budget sizes.
21In direct revelation mechanism the agents report their types. In equivalent indirect mechanism the
agents could report their planned allocations and a balanced allocation can be interpreted as neutral
type and allocation in favor of A (respectively, B) as the type biased to A (respectively, B).
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Eisensee, Thomas, and David Strömberg. 2007. “News Droughts, News
Floods, and U.S. Disaster Relief.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (2):
693-728.
Fink, Gunt, and Silvia Redaelli. 2011. “Determinants of International Emer-
gency Aid – Humanitarian Need Only?” World Development 39 (5): 741-757.
Francken, Nathalie, Bart Minten, and Johan F.M. Swinnen. 2012. “The
Political Economy of Relief Aid Allocation: Evidence from Madagascar.”
World Development 40 (3): 486–500.
Forges, Francoise. 1986. “An Approach to Communication Equilibria.” Econo-
metrica 54 (6): 1375–1385.
Forges, Francoise. 1990. “Universal Mechanisms.” Econometrica 58 (6): 1341–
1364.
Goltsman, Maria, Johannes Hörner, Gregory Pavlov, and Francesco
Squintani. 2009. “Mediation, Arbitration and Negotiation.” Journal of
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COORDINATING PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION 25
Economic Theory 144 (4): 1397-1420.
Goltsman, Maria, and Gregory Pavlov. 2014. “Communication in Cournot
Oligopoly.” Journal of Economic Theory 153 : 152-176.
Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija. 2007. “Coordination Failure in Foreign Aid.”
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 7 (1).
Hörner, Johannes, Massimo Morelli, and Francesco Squintani. 2015.
“Mediation and Peace.” Review of Economic Studies 82 (4): 1483-1501.
Ivanov, Maxim. 2010. “Communication via a Strategic Mediator.” Journal of
Economic Theory 145 (2), 869–884.
Jayne, Thomas S., John Strauss, Takashi Yamano, and Daniel Molla.
2001. “Giving to the Poor? Targeting of Food Aid in Rural Ethiopia.” World
Development 29 (5): 887–910.
Jayne, Thomas S., John Strauss, Takashi Yanamo, and Daniel Molla.
2002. “Targeting of Food Aid in Rural Ethiopia: Chronic Need or Inertia?”
Journal of Development Economics 68 (2): 247-288.
Krishna, Vijay, and John Morgan. 2004. “The Art of Conversation: Eliciting
Information from Experts through Multi-stage Communication.” Journal of
Economic Theory 117 (2): 147-179.
Myerson, Roger. 1982. “Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized
Principal-Agent Problems.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 10 (1): 67-
81.
Palfrey, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. “Testing for Effects of
Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information.” Games and
Economic Behavior 3 (2): 183-220.
Palfrey, Thomas, Howard Rosenthal, and Nilanjan Roy. 2017. “How
Cheap Talk Enhances Efficiency in Threshold Public Goods Games.” Games
and Economic Behavior 101 (1):234-259.
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Mathematical Appendix
A1. Appendix A
In Appendix A, we prove Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 in Section III.
Proof of Lemma 2.
We have show in the main text that any equilibrium is noninterior where an1 <
an2 and either a
`
1 = 0 or/and a
h
2 = 1 is noninterior. It remains to show the
uniqueness of equilibrium. By optimality,
(A1) an1 = 1−
∑
µt2 · at2(an1 )
where at2(a
n
1 ) is the optimal allocation a
t
2 of (6) when a1 = (max{0, an1 +`}, an1 , an1 +
h). Given (8), the RHS of (A1) is nonnegative when an1 = 0, increases continuously
in an1 at a rate strictly less than unity while a
n
1 is low enough so that a
n
1 ≤
|`| or an2 (an1 ) > 1 − h (i.e., while either a`1 or ah2(an1 ) is noninterior), but at a






1 ). Moreover, it assumes
an1 +Eb(µ1)−Eb(µ2) < an1 when an1 = |`| or ah2(an1 ) = 1, whichever happens later.
Therefore, there is a unique an1 such that 0 ≤ an1 < an2 (an1 ) and satisfies (A1),
hence a unique equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.







with the property that 0 < Eb(µ0) < h + `.
22 We start with some preliminary
results on allocation games under general posterior beliefs (that ensue after com-
munication).






i ) is agent i’s equilibrium allocation






i ) is that under another. If
ani < a
n
i , then E(ai|µi)−E(ai|µi) ≤ ani − ani for any µi, with equality if and only
if a`i and a
h
i are interior solutions when µ
`
i > 0 and µ
h
i > 0, respectively.
Proof. By Lemmas 1 and 2, ai satisfies a
`
i = max{0, ani + `} ≤ ani ≤ ahi =
min{1, ani +h} and similarly for ai. The conclusions then follow straightforwardly
from E(ai|µi)− E(ai|µi) = µ`i(a`i − a`i) + µni (ani − ani ) + µhi (ahi − ahi ).












2) be the equilibrium under
posterior (µ1, µ2) such that Eb(µ1) < Eb(µ2). Then,
(a) E(a1|µ1) ≥ an1 + Eb(µ1) with strict inequality if µ`1 > 0 and an1 < |`|.
(b) E(a2|µ2) ≤ an2 + Eb(µ2) with strict inequality if µh2 > 0 and an2 + h > 1.
(c) E(a1|µ1)− an1 = E(a2|µ2)− an2 .
Proof. Straightforward from (6) and Lemma 2.
22This property helps us address complications stemming from the fact that an agent’s equilibrium
allocation need not move in the opposite direction when the other agent’s expected bias changes.
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Lemma A3 Let âti = 1+t−E(a−i|µ−i), i.e., the unconstrained optimal allocation
of agent i of t-type relative to an allocation vector a−i ∈ [0, 1]3 of the other agent
with a posterior belief µ−i. Then, agent i’s utility from â
t
i is the same regardless
of his type and decreases by y2 if his allocation is y away from âti.
Proof. The expected utility of agent i of t-type from âti is
−µ`−i(E(a−i|µ−i)− a`−i)2 − µn−i(E(a−i|µ−i)− an−i)2 − µh−i(E(a−i|µ−i)− ah−i)2
independently of agent i’s type t. Subtracting from this his utility when his








Lemma A4 If Eb(µ1) < Eb(µ2) and Eb(µ1) < h + `, then a
h
2 is a noninterior
solution at the continuation equilibrium after (µ1, µ2).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that ah2 is an interior solution. Then, by Lemma
5, a`1 must be noninterior, i.e., a
n
1 < |`|. In such an equilibrium, we would have
an2 = 1−E(a1) = 1− (1−µ`1)an1 −µh1h and an1 = 1−E(a2) = 1−an2 −µh2h−µ`2`.
Solving these simultaneous equations, we get
an2 =
h(µh2(1− µ`1)− µh1) + `µ`2(1− µ`1) + µ`1
µ`1
; an1 =
h(µh1 − µh2)− `µ`2
µ`1
Thus,
an2 + h− 1 =
h(µh2(1− µ`1)− µh1 + µ`1) + `µ`2(1− µ`1)
µ`1
=
Eb(µ2)(1− µ`1) + hµ`1 − hµh1
µ`1
>
Eb(µ1)(1− µ`1) + hµ`1 − hµh1
µ`1
= h+ `− Eb(µ1) > 0,
contradicting the supposition that ah2 is interior. This completes the proof.
Returning to the task of proving Proposition 2, recall thatMi = {mi1,mi2, · · · ,miKi}
is the set ofKi messages sent by agent i with associated posteriors µi1, µi2, · · · , µiKi
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for i ∈ {1, 2}, labelled in such a way that
Eb(µi1) ≤ Eb(µi2) ≤ · · · ≤ Eb(µiKi) and Eb(µ11) ≤ Eb(µ21).
In the case that Eb(µ11) = Eb(µ21), label agents so that µ
h
11 > 0 if possible; else,
i.e., if µh11 = µ
h
21 = 0 then label agents so that a
h
1 is interior in the continuation
equilibrium after (µ11, µ21), which is possible due to (∗).
If Eb(µ11) = Eb(µ0), then Eb(µ11) = Eb(µ1K1) and Eb(µ11) = Eb(µ21) =
Eb(µ0) = Eb(µ2K2), thus the equilibrium outcome is equivalent to the case of no
communication by Lemma 1. Therefore, below we assume
(A2) Eb(µ11) < Eb(µ0) < Eb(µ1K1).
To facilitate exposition, we state a lemma on comparing messages for different
types.
Lemma A5 If agent i of a type t ∈ {`, h} always gets his unconstrained optimum
after sending mik (even if irrelevant) but weakly prefers sending mik′ even if he
sometimes gets less than the unconstrained optimum after mik′ , then agent i of
n-type strictly prefers sending mik′ to mik.
Proof. Recall that an n-type agent always gets his unconstrained optimum. For
each message of the other agent, therefore, the net gain of agent i from sending
mik′ rather than mik for t-type is the same as that for n-type if t-type gets
unconstrained optimum after mik′ , but is smaller otherwise. Thus, if the t-type
weakly prefers sending mik′ to mik then an n-type must strictly prefer sending
mik′ .
Note that the equilibrium level of ah1 is an interior solution (i.e., the uncon-
strained optimum) under the posterior (µ11, µ2k) for any k ∈ {1, · · · ,K2} by




from Eb(µ1K1) > Eb(µ0) > 0, agent 1 of h-type weakly prefers sending m1K1 to
m11. Hence, by Lemma A5, agent 1 of n-type should strictly prefer sending m1K1
to m11, implying µ
n
11 = 0.
In addition, agent 1 of `-type obtains his unconstrained optimum after sending
m1K1 if agent 2 sent m2k such that Eb(µ2k) < Eb(µ1K1) by Lemma 2. Thus, if
there is no message m2κ ∈ M2 such that Eb(µ2κ) ≥ Eb(µ1K1) and agent 1’s net
benefit of sending m1K1 rather than m11 conditional on µ2 = µ2κ is strictly lower
for `-type than for n-type, then agent 1’s unconditional net benefit of sending
m1K1 rather than m11 is no lower for `-type than for n-type by Lemma A3. As
agent 1 of n-type strictly prefers sending m1K1 to m11 as argued above, this
would imply that so does `-type, and thus that µ`11 = µ
n
11 = 0, contradicting
Eb(µ11) < Eb(µ0). Therefore,
[1] for some message m2κ such that Eb(µ2κ) ≥ Eb(µ1K1), agent 1’s net benefit
of sending m1K1 rather than m11 conditional on µ2 = µ2κ is strictly lower
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for `-type than for n-type.
























and ã`1 = 0 must hold. Hence, from (6),
0 < an1 − ãn1 = E(ã2|µ2κ)− E(a2|µ2κ) ≤ ãn2 − an2 = E(a1|µ11)− E(ã1|µ1K1)
where the second inequality is from Lemma A1. Thus,
(A3) E(a1|µ11)− an1 ≥ E(ã1|µ1K1)− ãn1 ≥ E(a1|µ1K1)− an1 > Eb(µ0)
where the second inequality is from Lemma A1.
At this point, we show that Eb(µ21) ≤ Eb(µ12). With a view to reaching a
contradiction, suppose otherwise. Then, µn12 = 0 by the same reasoning that led to
µn11 = 0 (cf. Lemma ma A5). Thus, we may assume Eb(µ11) < Eb(µ12) < Eb(µ21)
because messages m11 and m12 may be identified if Eb(µ11) = Eb(µ12) by (∗).
From the formula (6) it can then be verified that for each m2k, a
n
2 is higher in
the continuation equilibrium after (m11,m2k) than in that after (m12,m2k). This
would mean that agent 2’s allocation has lower variance after (m11,m2k) than
after (m12,m2k), hence that agent 1 of h-type would strictly prefer sending m11
to m12. As this would contradict Eb(µ11) < Eb(µ12), we deduce that Eb(µ21) ≤
Eb(µ12) must hold.
Given this, we now show that either
[2] agent 2’s net benefit of sending m2κ rather than m21 conditional on µ1 = µ11
is weakly larger for h-type than for n-type, or
[2’] ah2 is noninterior in the continuation equilibrium after (m12,m21), which is
possible only if Eb(µ21) = Eb(µ12).
With a view to reaching a contradiction, suppose otherwise. Then, agent 2’s
unconditional net benefit of sending m2κ rather than m21 is strictly larger for
n-type than for h-type, and the net benefit is no lower for `-type than n-type.
Since µh2κ > 0, implying that agent 2 of h-type weakly prefers sending m2κ to
m21, it would follow that agent 2 of both `-type and n-type strictly prefer m2κ to
m21, contradicting Eb(µ21) < Eb(µ0).
The remaining part of the proof differs slightly depending on whether [2] holds
or not. If [2] holds, let (ă1, ă2) denote the continuation equilibrium after (µ11, µ21).
By Lemma A3 and [2] above, an2 ≤ ăn2 must hold. From (6) and Lemma A1, we
deduce 0 ≤ ăn2 − an2 = E(a1|µ11)−E(ă1|µ11) ≤ an1 − ăn1 = E(ă2|µ21)−E(a2|µ2κ)
and thus,
(A4) E(a2|µ2κ)− an2 ≤ E(ă2|µ21)− ăn2 < Eb(µ21) ≤ Eb(µ0)
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where the second inequality follows from Lemma A2-(b). But, (A3) and (A4)
cannot hold at the same time by Lemma A2-(c). This proves that (A2) is not
viable.
Finally, if [2] does not hold, then [2’] should hold. Then, by an analogous argu-
ment, [1] should hold with m11 replaced by m12 and consequently, so should (A3)
with µ11 replaced by µ12 and (a1, a2) representing the continuation equilibrium
under (µ12, µ2κ). In addition, by the same reasoning underlying [2], it follows
that
[2”] agent 2’s net benefit of sending m2κ rather than m21 conditional on µ1 = µ12
is weakly larger for h-type than for n-type.
This further leads to (A4) which is incompatible with (A3), thus establishing that
(A2) is not viable. The proof of Proposition 2 is complete. Q.E.D.
A2. Appendix B
In Appendix B, we provide deferred proofs in Section IV.
Proof of Lemma 4.
(a) Let µi = βiµb + (1 − βi)µn for i = 1, 2, where 0 < β1 ≤ β2 < 1. The
continuation equilibrium for the posterior (µ1, µ2) is straightforwardly calculated




− ` and an2 = 1 + `−
(h+ `)β1
β2
with ati = a
n
i + t for t ∈ {h, `} and i = 1, 2, except ah2 = 1. Note that this
includes the case β1 = β2 when the continuation equilibrium is interior. From this,
the expected welfare conditional on (µ1, µ2) having been announced is routinely
calculated as
W0 =
β21(β2 − 2)(h+ `)2 − 2β1β2(h2 − 2h`− `2)− 4β22`2
4β2
Now suppose µ2 is decomposed into µn = (0, 1, 0) and µb = (1/2, 0, 1/2). The
continuation equilibrium after (µ1, µn) is clearly a
n
2 = −` and at1 = 1 + ` + t for
t ∈ T , and that after (µ1, µb) is (A5) when β2 = 1, again with ati = ani + t for
t ∈ {h, `} and i = 1, 2, except ah2 = 1. Thus, the expected welfare conditional on
either (µ1, µn) or (µ1, µb) is announced is calculated as
WS =
−β21β2(h+ `)2 − β1(4`2 + β2(2h2 − 4h`− 6`2))− 4β2`2
4
.









where the inequality ensues because, given β1 ≤ β2, the expression inside the
bracket decreases in ` reaching the lowest value of h(2β2 + β1(2 + β2)) > 0 at
` = 0.
(b) The continuation equilibrium for the posterior (µ1, µ2) = (µ1, µb) is (A5)




i + t for t ∈ {h, `} and i = 1, 2, except ah2 = 1. From
this, the expected welfare conditional on (µ1, µb) is announced is calculated as
W1(β1) =
2h`β1(2− β1)− `2(4− 2β1 + β21)− h2β1(2 + β1)
4
.
After decomposition, the continuation equilibrium after (µn, µb) is clearly a
n
1 =
−` and at2 = 1 + ` + t for t ∈ T , and that after (µb, µb) is as in Lemma 1 of the
main text when µhi = µ
`
i = 1/2. Thus, the expected welfare conditional on either
(µ1, µn) or (µ1, µb) is announced is calculated as−(1−β1)`2−β1(3h2−2h`+3`2)/4.
Subtracting this from W1(ν1), we get (h+ `)
2β1(1− β1)/4 > 0.
(c) Let p =
∑
t π(µ1, µb|t) and p̃ =
∑
t π(µ̃1, µb|t) denote the ex-ante probability
that (µ1, µb) and (µ̃1, µb) announced by π. When the two are merged, it forms a
posterior pair (µ̂1, µb) where µ̂1 = (pµ1 + p̃µ̃1) / (p+ p̃). Hence, subtracting the





− pW1(β1)− p̃W1(β̃1) > 0
where the inequality ensues because W1(·) in strictly concave as verified by its
second derivative being −(h+ `)2/2.
Proof of Lemma 5.
The continuation equilibrium after (µ1, µ2) = (µn, µ2) is
an1 = −`, ah2 = 1, an2 = 1 + `, a`2 = 1 + 2`,
which is also the continuation equilibrium after (µn, µb), while that after (µn, µn)
is clearly any (an1 , a
n




2 = 1. Thus, it is evident that the total
allocation to area A is the same for each possible type profile under (µ1, µ2) and
when µ2 is separated, establishing the equivalence of the expected welfare.
To check IC for each agent, we need to consider the dual posterior as well
because both agents are equally likely to play the role of agent 1 and agent 2
after reporting. Conditional on (µ1, µ2) is announced, each agent of all types
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derive the same expected payoff u1 = −β2`2 as agent 1, but as agent 2 types `
and n derive a payoff of 0 while type h derives −(h+ `)2. By reporting r = h or
r = `, therefore, an agent derives the payoff of agent 2 with 1/2 of the probability[




β0(1 − β0) + β20
]
= (1 − β0)π(µ1, µ2|n, b) where β0 =
1−µn0 = 2/3. By reporting r = n, however, he derives agent 1’s payoff with 1/2 of
the probability (1− β0)π(µ1, µ2|n, n) + β0π(µ1, µ2|n, b) and agent 2’s payoff with
1/2 of the probability (1− β0)π(µ1, µ2|n, n). Hence, the net benefit of reporting
n rather than r 6= n is 1/2 of
−
[





π(µ1, µ2|n, n)−π(µ1, µ2|n, b)
]
ut2
where u`2 = u
n
2 = 0 and u
h
2 = −(h+ `)2.
Upon decomposition, conditional on (µ1, µb), each agent of all types derive the
same expected payoff −`2 as agent 1, but as agent 2 types ` and n derive a payoff
of 0 while type h derives −(h + `)2. Conditional on (µ1, µn) = (µn, µn), each
agent’s payoff is −t2/2 depending on type t ∈ {`, n, h}.
By reporting r = h or r = `, therefore, an agent derives 0 if t 6= h and −(h+`)2
if t = h with 1/2 of the probability (1 − β0)π(µ1, µ2|n, b). By reporting r = n,
however, he derives −t2/2 of the probability (1− β0)π(µ1, µ2|n, n) and −`2 with
probability 1/2 of β0π(µ1, µ2|n, b) Hence, the net benefit of reporting n rather
than r 6= n is 1/2 of
−(1− β0)π(µ1, µ2|n, n)t2 − β0π(µ1, µ2|n, b)`2 − (1− β0)π(µ1, µ2|n, b)ut2.








2πn,b) − 2πn,n)`2 − 2πn,nh`
)
/6 > 0 for types t = `, n and h, respectively, where
πn,n = π(µ1, µ2|n, n) and πn,b = π(µ1, µ2|n, b). The signs are verified as above
because 1− β2 = πn,n/ (πn,n + πn,b). Consequently, the incentive to misreport is
lower for t = h, `, but higher for t = n, after decomposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.
From any symmetric and consistent scheme, one can (weakly) increase the
welfare conditional on truthful reporting, by decomposing according to Lemmas
4(a) and 5 and merge according to Lemma 4(c) until no such modification is
possible. Let π∗ be the resulting scheme which is clearly consistent. Any posterior
profile µ = (µ1, µ2) in the support of π
∗ must satisfy (i) at most one posterior
(i.e., not both µ1 and µ2) is composite, (ii) there is a unique posterior, say µ
′,
such that if µi = µb then µ−i = µ
′, and (iii) if µi = µn then µ−i ∈ {µn, µb}.
Note that µ′ in (ii) is a composite posterior because when one agent is biased the
other agent may be both biased and unbiased. Then, (iii) implies that if µi = µn
then µ−i = µn. In conjunction with symmetry, it further follows that if µi = µb
then agent −i is equally likely to be biased and not, i.e., µ−i = 0.5µb + 0.5µn.
This verifies (11).
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Therefore, π∗ defined in (11) maximizes the welfare among all consistent schemes
conditional on truthful reporting, because any other consistent (and symmetric)
scheme can be modified to π∗ without reducing welfare.
It remains to show when π∗ is optimal, which amounts to delineating when
π is IC. When both agents are neutral, the probabilities do not matter with
which allocation pairs (a, ā) and (ā, a) are announced (along with the posterior
(µn, µn)) where a = (0, 0, h) and ā = (1 + `, 1, 1). This is because, whatever
the probabilities, each agent expect (a, ā) and (ā, a) with equal probability due to
symmetric treatment of the two agents. However, it is optimal that the instructed
allocations are complete specialization of each agent in one area, because any less
specialization would increase the incentive for biased agents to report neutral.
Consider agent i of type `. By reporting r = ` (or h), he obtains an expected
payoff u`2 after (µ0.5, µb) as agent 2 with probability 2/3, and an expected payoff
of u`1 after (µ0.5, µb) as agent 1 with probability 1/3, hence an overall expected
payoff of (u`1 + 2u
`
2)/3. By untruthfully reporting r = n, on the other hand, he
obtains an expected payoff of −`2/2 after (µn, µn) with probability 1/3, and either
u`1 after (µ0.5, µb) or u
`
2 after (µb, µ0.5) with the remaining probability, hence an
overall expected payoff of (−`2/2 + 2u`1)/3. Hence, the net gain from untruthful
reporting for an `-type agent is
−`2/2 + u`1 − 2u`2
3
=
5h2 + 2h`− 11`2
48
.
In an analogous manner we calculate the net gain from untruthful reporting for
an h-type agent as
−h2/2 + uh1 − 2uh2
3
=
5h2 + 18h`+ 5`2
48
.




5h2 + 2h`− 3`2
48
.
Thus, it is routinely verified that n-type has no incentive to report untruthfully
always, h-type if ` ≤ −(9−2
√
14)h/5 ≈ −0.3h, and `-type if ` ≤ (1−2
√
14)h/11,
completing the proof. Q.E.D.
Remark on extending Proposition 3: Note that Lemmas 4 and 5 concern
consistent posterior pairs that may be announced subject to (c1) and (c2), hence
continue to hold for prior beliefs µ0 even if µ
n
0 6= 1/3 so long as µh0 = µ`0. In
addition, Lemmas 4 and 5 continue to hold for prior beliefs such that µh0 and µ
`
0
are close enough, due to continuity of continuation equilibrium in the posterior
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profile.23 Therefore, Proposition 3 extends to an open set of prior beliefs that




0 ∈ (0, 1/2), with an appropriately modified
range of ` for which π∗ is an optimal scheme.
23For Lemma 5, it is straightforward to verify that the continuation equilibrium after (µn, µ2) coincides
with that after (µn, µb) even if µ
h
0 6= µ`0.
